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THE EUROPEAN COURT’S POLITICAL POWER ACROSS TIME AND SPACE
By Karen J. Alter, Northwestern University
Forthcoming in Revue française de science politique (Vol 59, 2009)

Most work on the European Court of Justice (ECJ) builds on two seminal
studies that documented how the ECJ helped transform the European legal system. In
1981, Eric Stein published ‘Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational
Constitution’ revealing how collectively the ECJ jurisprudence transformed an
international treaty into a constitution for Europe. Joseph Weiler expanded Stein’s
analysis in his 1991 classic The Transformation of Europe, showing how the ECJ’s
constitutional doctrines stretched existing legal practices and ‘closed exit’ by making it
harder for member states to escape their legal obligations through their own creative
interpretations or via non-compliance. Stein’s and Weiler’s accounts remain
uncontested classics, providing incontrovertible evidence that the ECJ did use creative
legal interpretations to establish for the ECJ a broader role in European politics. But we
need to go beyond their accounts. Stein and Weiler do not ask “why did litigants and
national judges invite the ECJ to render its audacious decisions?” Moreover, the
narratives provided by Stein and Weiler draw on conceptions of the power of courts that
implicitly suggest any court could do as the ECJ did—interpret its mandate broadly so
as to construct the building blocs of its capacious influence and authority.
Subsequent research has revealed significant variations in the political influence
of the ECJ, based in large part on varied demand for legal enforcement of European
rules. The variation in itself raise questions. Why would the ECJ be an audacious
and/or influential political actor only over some issues and in some contexts? The
question then becomes “what political and social factors make it possible for courts to
build their legal and political authority?” My research on the ECJ uses variation in the
ECJ’s influence over time and space to understand how the political and social context
contributes to the influence of the ECJ.
This article is adapted from the introduction and conclusion of my new book
The European Court’s Political Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), which
brings together 15 years of my articles and book chapters regarding the European Court
of Justice’s political role in European politics. The introduction and conclusion pull out
a common narrative from extensively researched chapters that focus on different pieces
and parts of the ECJ’s history. The common story told across analyses is that the ECJ
gains influence by allying with societal actors within states to encourage greater respect
for European rules. The larger volume shows that societal actors do not always choose
to draw the ECJ into their campaigns. Also, the ECJ’s agency matters—the ECJ at times
chooses to play a minimalist role, interpreting law narrowly and even illogically when
there is little social support for the law it is asked to apply. The analysis suggests that
factors exogenous to the ECJ, activation by others and the presence of societal actors
who share the ECJ’s substantive objectives, are the largest factors shaping the role the
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ECJ plays. The larger book embeds this narrative across issues and cases so that we can
see what makes societal actors want to work with the ECJ, and vice versa.
My interest in the ECJ’s experience has always been to understand the
possibilities for international courts (ICs) and international law more generally. Even if
a reader does not share this interest, however, I think they will find that they understand
the European experience better through comparing the ECJ to other ICs. The ECJ was
from inception an unusual international court. The ECJ had a unique design: member
states could not opt out of the ECJ’s authority, and non-state actors (the High
Authority/Commission and private actors) were authorized to initiate suits and even to
seize the ECJ to challenge member state policy. European integration also arguably had
broader aspirations, compared to the United Nations for example. The concept ‘supranational’ was created to capture these usual qualities. But what were once unique
attributes of the ECJ are no longer so.
Today most IC designs are closer to the design of Europe’s supranational courts
than they are to the design of the International Court of Justice. Most ICs have
compulsory jurisdiction and non-state actors are allowed to initiate disputes against
state and international actors (Alter 2006). There are also many other international
institutions with broad aspirations, and thus many other ICs that have been delegated
the same types of authority the ECJ has.1 In other words, there are more ICs with the
ECJ’s design and official authority to be powerful political actors. Yet almost none of
these other ICs have replicated the ECJ’s experience.
Observing these trends, I conducted extensive research on the case which comes
closest to resembling the ECJ. The Andean Tribunal of Justice (ATJ) is the ECJ’s
jurisdictional clone. It was created in 1984, and modeled explicitly on the European
Court of Justice (Keener 1987); it shares the preliminary ruling system of the European
legal system, and it also has a foundational treaty (the Cartagena Agreement) which lays
out a structure for creating a common market and allows for Andean rules to create
direct internal effects within national systems.2 The ATJ has extensively mimicked the
ECJ. It had a foundational period much like the ECJ’s foundational period (discussed
by Weiler, 1991), during which it declared the supremacy and direct effect of Andean
law, using identical terms to the ECJ (indeed it both replicated and cited key
foundational ECJ legal decisions).3 The ATJ also has had cases to adjudication; with
over 1400 decisions to date it is the third most active international court—less active
than the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, but more
1

In fact over half of operating ICs have been delegated an enforcement role where a supranational
prosecutor is empowered to raise cases against state actors (11 out of 20), forty percent (8 out of 20) have
been delegated an administrative review role where the IC can review the validity of decisions of
supranational administrative actors and in some cases of national implementation of supranational rules,
and at least five, possibly seven, international courts have been delegated explicit constitutional review
roles including the power to invalidate supranational legislation and in some cases the power to review the
compatibility of international rules with domestic policy (Alter 2008: 62).
2
Note that in 1996 the ATJ court treaty was revised, so Keener’s analysis of the substantive jurisdiction of
the ATJ is outdated.
3
I discuss these developments in an article that is not yet complete: (Alter and Helfer Manuscript in
progress)
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than twice as busy as the International Court of Justice, the World Trade Organization’s
dispute resolution body, the Inter-American Court of Human rights and the International
Criminal Court combined! Most of the ATJ’s docket comes via national court
references, and the ATJ has replicated the ECJ’s ability to influence policy. But its
influence pertains to a single substantive domain—intellectual property disputes
(Helfer, Alter, and Guerzovich 2009). For other areas of law, the ATJ lacks a
fundamental demand for activist decisions, and the ATJ demurs from purposeful
interpretations that could be helpful to the litigants. The contrast between the ATJ and
the ECJ led me back to Europe, forcing me to reexamine what I thought I understood
about the European legal system.
There are of course a number of exceptional elements that set the ECJ apart
from other ICs. The European Union has far more secondary legislation than does any
other international institution, which contributes to the broader range of issues litigated
(Stone Sweet 2004: 58-64). The extent of legislation and litigation suggests that in
Europe supranational and domestic politics are more intertwined (Cichowski 2007). But
this was not always so. Stein’s and Weiler’s analysis are so intriguing because the ECJ
laid the foundations for its political authority at a time when there was not much
secondary legislation nor great political support for the objectives of building a common
market. In a similar context the ATJ followed the ECJ’s early constitutionalization of
the legal system, but it refused to use the Andean legal system as a tool to force market
integration (Saldias 2007).
In short, it is now clear that the differences in the design of the ECJ cannot
explain why the ECJ was so successful compared to other ICs, nor can the extent of
ECJ legislation explain early differences between the ECJ and the European Court of
Human Rights, and other ICs. Where some would therefore say that the ECJ is sui
generis, for me these exceptional qualities simply call for explanation. I see the ECJ as
representing the far end of the continuum of influence for an international court—the
ECJ is about the most powerful and influential international court that is realistically
possible. I tend to view limits to the ECJ’s power and influence as ‘normal’—general
limitations that even the most powerful courts face. This does not mean that I expect all
international courts to follow the ECJ’s trajectory. Rather I believe that if we can unlock
why the ECJ is so successful, we can then understand better the challenges that limit the
influence and political power of other international courts. And, if we can understand
the limits of the ECJ, we can adjust our expectations—we can figure out what limits are
inherent to even the most independent and powerful courts (after all, every actor faces
limits), and what limits are specific for a particular court or particular political system.
As a by-product, we will understand the European Court of Justice’s own history better.
It is in this context that I set about drawing together and reflecting on my work
on the European Court of Justice. This essay draws from the analyses in my 2009 book
to identify the larger factors shaping European Community legal politics across time
and space. The book’s individual chapters reveal the fuller story, and they more
adequately reference the scholarship of others.
Part I of this essay focuses on the early history of the European Court of
Justice—when the ECJ was both a typically ineffective international court in some
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ways, and exceptionally activist and influential court in other ways. It adds to wellknown accounts of the ECJ’s transformation of the European legal system a comparison
of the ECJ in the context of the ECSC (from 1951–2002), and an analysis of the role of
transnational jurist advocacy movements in promoting early European legal integration.
It then summarizes my argument of how the ECJ induced national courts and national
governments to support the transformation of the European legal system. By the end of
Part I, we have the ECJ of today—a constitutional court for Europe in all but name,
with the supremacy and direct effect of European law, and national courts as willing
enforcers of ECJ jurisprudence. Part II focuses on factors that generate variation in the
influence of this court on European politics and policy. In this essay, these ideas are
asserted. The reader should look to my 2009 book for evidence and citations to support
the claims. Part III speculates on why the ECJ has been such an exceptional
international court. Part IV concludes by identifying an agenda for further research on
the ECJ.

I. Rethinking the European Court of Justice During the
Founding Period of Legal Integration (1952–80)
The first part of the book divides according to issues and actors the foundational
period during which the ECJ’s authority was built. Here I mainly summarize the key
findings thereby identifying the constituent parts that contributed to the ECJ’s early
success. The discussion is mostly a roadmap of where to look for the fuller explanations
the book provides.
The ECJ’s early history introduces a theoretically tantalizing juxtaposition.
Through pretty much the entire 50-year history of the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC), the ECJ was both timid and ineffectual at compelling compliance
with ECSC rules, let alone in facilitating political or policy change. But at the same
time that the ECJ of the ECSC was doing very little (1960s and 1970s), the ECJ was
bold and assertive in constitutionalizing the European Community Treaty to create a
quasi-federal legal order. I argue that a distinct set of social forces emerged in the
1960s, which allowed the ECJ to be so bold in the context of the early European
Economic Community (EEC). I then investigate how the ECJ co-opted national judges
and national governments into its project of constitutionalizing the European legal
system.
In an essay entitled The Theory and Reality of the European Coal and Steel
Community (with David Steinberg) I analyzed the 50-year history of Europe’s Coal and
Steel Community, which was established in 1951.4 The analysis confirms what others
have also found. Haas was right that the ECSC achieved many of its formal goals
during its early history, including the elimination of tariffs and quotas. But in fact there
were no tariffs or quotas protecting European coal and steel markets at the time, thus the
achievement was purely formal and symbolic. We followed the ECSC’s role up until
2002, finding that until the 1980s the ECSC as an institution had little influence over
how European coal and steel sectors developed and adapted to changes in the
4

This essay is reprinted as Chapter 3 of my 2009 book.
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international political economy, in large part because its institutions were sidelined and
its rules were never fully implemented. (In the 1980s the ECSC became the chosen
forum used by states to shut down their big steel industries, a policy choice that was
reluctantly forced on states by international market developments.)
This analysis challenges a central claim about the early period of European
legal integration. A common view is that the ECJ is most expansionist in its
interpretations when the political process is blocked (Weiler 1981). But in the context of
the ECSC, the political process was blocked and the ECJ was not expansionist. The
reality that the ECSC for so long had little political influence begs the question: Why
was the ECSC of so little substantive import? Why were ECSC rules barely if at all
enforced? What does the very limited role played by the ECJ in this history tell us about
the dynamics shaping law and politics in the European Union?
You will have to read the analysis for the fuller story, but the gist of the analysis
is that the reason ECSC rules were ignored is that governments, firms, and workers had
little interest in actually building a common market in coal and steel, thus the High
Authority and the ECJ lacked social and political support. We argue that there were
benefits to be gained by enforcing ECSC rules, but states did not want to dismantle the
true barriers to free trade—the cartels, subsidies, differential transportation rates, and
manipulative market practices (e.g. deviating from published prices and delivering extra
goods), which ensured that steel markets remained nationally segmented. Steel
industries also preferred national help over ECSC help. As a result, Europe’s coal and
steel policy remained nationally defined until the mid 1980s.
A logical question to ask is if states did not want a common market, why did
they create the ECSC in the first place? The larger essay answers this question, but then
argues that even after the ECSC lost its initial purpose, the ECSC did not lack an
economic or political basis to proceed. There were still benefits to be had, and litigants
who could benefit from the enforcement of ECSC rules. The ECJ could have also been
a more forceful actor, providing purposeful interpretations instead of using
technicalities to avoid issuing decisions of substance. But firms understood labor
unions’ desires to create and hold high paid jobs in the coal and steel sectors. European
governments and economic actors were also convinced by the conventional wisdom of
the day that having a national steel industry was key for industrial development and
national security. European governments repeatedly aided ailing national coal and steel
industries in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, holding for themselves the political benefits
associated with strong government intervention in the economy. Meanwhile those
actors who might have gained from a more integrated European coal and steel industry
eschewed the potential advantages of using litigation to promote their economic
advantage. Knowing that ECSC rules lacked any real domestic political support, the
ECJ refrained from aggressively interpreting and enforcing ECSC rules in the cases that
were brought.
What does this experience tell us about the political role of the ECJ? The ECSC
had the most muscular and innovative international enforcement mechanism that existed
at the time (Levi 1976: 70-71). Some ECSC cases did reach the ECJ in the 1950s and
1960s, but these cases either did not ask or failed to remedy states’ general non-
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compliance with ECSC rules. It is worth returning to Stuart Scheingold’s truly excellent
book about this period. Scheingold has investigated every ECJ decision with respect to
the ECSC (up until 1965 when the book was published) and found cases where the
litigants settled out of court. Scheingold argues that the ECJ and litigants were
responding to the High Authority’s fundamental weakness. A closer look at
Scheingold’s cases suggests that private litigants were quite willing to challenge High
Authority actions that they did not like; the ECJ responded by ensuring that the High
Authority stuck close to its legal mandate. Yet ECJ judges must have surmised the lack
of political or societal support for ECSC rules, and for building a common market in
coal and steel more generally.5
An interesting juxtaposition that The Theory and Reality of the European Coal
and Steel Community did not explore is that the ECSC was floundering at the exact
same moment in time when the EEC’s legal system was taking off.6 Scheingold
published his analysis of the ECSC rule of law in 1965—after the ECJ’s activist 1962
Van Gend and 1964 Costa v. Enel rulings. Scheingold found signs that the ECJ was
working to build a rule of law, but it was a fairly limited and technical rule of law.
While Scheingold found no evidence of the ECJ yielding to government pressure, he
found a number of examples where the ECJ used technical rulings to avoid controversy.
In these cases, Scheingold argued, the ECJ largely avoided making decisions of
substance. Scheingold concluded from these examples that political tools to control the
ECJ, including the short tenure of ECJ judges, appeared to be fairly effective in limiting
ECJ activism (Scheingold 1965: 34). My larger body of work also found that the ECJ in
the 1960s avoided making decisions with a substantive impact, so as to avoid provoking
a political response (See Alter 1998 reprinted in the 2009 volume). But an important
difference is that the ECJ was doctrinally bold in the context of the EEC, issuing rulings
that clearly were not the intention of national governments. Why was the ECJ a
typically timid and fairly ineffectual international court in the ECSC context while
simultaneously an audacious international court in the EEC context? In neither context
did member states seem to actually want to build a common market, at least not in the
1960s.
In an essay entitled Jurist Advocacy Movements in Europe: The Role of EuroLaw Associations in European Integration (1953–1975) I offer an answer to this
question by reconstructing the efforts of nationally based Euro-law associations to use
legal means to promote a political agenda that was being thwarted by Charles de Gaulle
and his supporters.7 The analysis compares the role of Euro-law associations to the
Andean experience where there have been no associations supporting the Andean
Tribunal of Justice. The comparison helps underscore how much the ECJ benefited
5

Parenthetically, although Weiler’s analysis should travel to the Andean context (e.g. the ATJ’s authority
should have become more broadly recognized; the ATJ should have helped to close exist), Scheingold’s
analysis is a far better fit for explaining the Andean Tribunal’s experience.
6
Ironically, just as Haas’ Uniting of Europe was published, France, Germany, and Italy blocked the High
Authority’s efforts to invoke its exceptional powers to deal with a crisis in the coal sector. From 1958–
1965, European governments made a number of important decisions that basically ensured that an
integrated coal and steel market under supranational authority would not emerge.
7
The analysis appears for the first time as chapter 4 of the 2009 book.
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from having an ideologically driven kitchen cabinet of support,8 and how helpful it was
that association members included politically well placed individuals who could use
their offices (as legal counsels, judges, scholars, and government officials) to aid the
ECJ’s constitutionalization project.
This revisionist account of the orchestration behind the ECJ’s
constitutionalization process reinforces what the focus on the ECSC had also found—
self-interested actors do not spontaneously arise to promote market integration. Activist
litigants and judges need to be inspired by more than narrow self interest—they need to
believe that their interest serves a larger social purpose. Without this shared sense,
either litigants will not raise provocative cases and/or judges will not reward litigants
with far-reaching rulings. The result will either be a very limited jurisprudence, one
that is neither expansionist nor transformative, like the ECJ’s jurisprudence in the
context of the ECSC. Or, there may even be a negative feedback effect where narrow
rulings undermine litigant incentives, limiting the extent to which actors seek to use
international courts to enforce international rules (as has occurred in the Andean
context).
Of course Euro-law associations were pro-integration in the first place. In
English we say that they were the “choir” the ECJ was preaching too. For the ECJ to
succeed in its endeavor, it had to convince people who were not already part of the
ECJ’s choir. My 2001 book sought to explain how national judges and governments
were co-opted into the ECJ’s project.
While most national legal systems did not accept the ECJ’s argument that the
“special nature” of the Treaty of Rome and the European legal system implied the
supremacy of European law, national judiciaries in all member states have found ways
to accommodate the supremacy of European law. My 2009 book includes my earlier
article which makes it very clear that there were compelling legal and political reasons,
argued strongly by national judges, to reject the ECJ’s supremacy doctrine.9 I suggest
that member states’ highest national courts were most antagonistic to the ECJ’s
supremacy doctrine, because the supremacy doctrine was more threatening to their own
institutional independence and authority. For lower courts, I argued, the ECJ offered a
choice. By appealing to EC law and the ECJ, lower courts could circumvent doctrinal
obstacles created by higher courts. They could also simply not consult the ECJ, which
they were not legally required to do, and even challenge ECJ decisions sending a
contrary interpretation up for appeal. High courts could also use EC law to circumvent
national legal barriers. Or, they could avoid the ECJ and even challenge its authority.
My book Establishing the Supremacy of European Law (2001) shows how
contestation across higher and lower courts, and across branches of within national legal
8

The American term “kitchen cabinet” refers to President Andrew Jackson’s practice of circumventing
his real cabinet (the one approved by the Senate) to instead plan policy with like-minded friends. National
governments are arguably the ECJ’s statutory cabinet, since they write the laws the ECJ is interpreting.
Euro-law associations were the ECJ’s kitchen cabinet, providing a means for European officials to test
out ideas and seek informal advice, which was especially important given that in the 1960s national
political leaders were challenging the supranational aspects of European integration.
9

The article is reprinted as Chapter 5 of my 2009 book.
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systems, shifted the terrain from under the most antagonistic national courts. While
there were national judges and national courts that clearly wanted to limit the ECJ’s
authority and power, these judges were unable to stop others from turning to the
European legal system. Intransigence vis-à-vis ECJ jurisprudence lost all influence and
affect in a context where other national courts were inviting the ECJ to issue
interpretively expansionist legal rulings, and where these national judges were bringing
ECJ doctrine and ECJ rulings into national legal systems. Also, the actions of prointegration national judges, and national judges who simply followed what EC law
required, exposed the fallacy of the arguments of intransigent national judges.
Opponents of European law supremacy had argued that European and national law did
not allow for the supremacy of European law, and they suggested that granting
European law supremacy would create a politically untenable situation. Over time it
became very clear that a number of national courts found legal means to accommodate
ECJ jurisprudence, and their actions did not provoke a political rebuke. Increasingly,
the claims of recalcitrant national judges looked both implausible and out of sync with
the larger legal and political trends of the time (See Alter 2001 for more).
The second group of actors who had to be co-opted were national governments.
In a 1998 article10 I argued that the transformation of the European legal system by the
ECJ limited the possible responses of national governments to its decisions within the
domestic political realm. In the early years of the EU legal system, national politicians
turned to extralegal means to circumvent unwanted decisions; they asserted the
illegitimacy of the decisions in a battle for political legitimacy at home, instructed
national administrations and national judges to ignore ECJ jurisprudence, or interpreted
away any difference between EC law and national policy. The threat that national
governments might turn to these extralegal means, disobeying an ECJ decision, helped
contain ECJ activism. With national courts enforcing ECJ jurisprudence against their
own governments, however, many of these extralegal avenues no longer worked.
Because of national judicial support for ECJ jurisprudence, national governments were
forced to frame their response in terms that could persuade a legal audience, and thus
they became constrained by the legal rules of the game. The larger essay also considers
why member states have not used their other tools to influence the ECJ—they have not
restricted the ECJ’s jurisdictional mandate or tampered with the ECJ through the
appointments process. I explain this paradox, providing evidence of a pattern where
states are unable to reign in ECJ excesses, but they do “learn” which leads them to write
European rules more carefully and circumscribe future delegations.
As a collection, the analyses I undertake in my 2009 book suggest much more
contingency about the European experience than is often presumed. While located in
Europe, in a sea of liberal states, the ECJ can also suffer from having a fragile legal
authority. Indeed the ECJ, like all courts, must strive to stay in sync with larger societal
interests—which is not to say that it must kowtow to the preferences of governments in
power. A number of factors came together in the 1960s to give the ECJ the social
support it needed to be more interpretively expansionist. The essays in this special
edition help document these factors.
10
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The question then becomes what accounts for the varied influence of the ECJ
across time and space. The next section turns to this question.

II. The ECJ and its Varied Influence on European Policy and
Politics (1980–2005)
The chapters in Part II of my book try to understand when and how the ECJ comes to
politically influence particular outcomes. The ECJ needs more than a latent social
support; to exert influence it needs to be activated by litigants and to have its legal
pronouncements picked up by those actors who want its jurisprudence respected. What
factors influence where and when interlocutors—litigants, judges, and the implementers
of ECJ rulings—embrace ECJ interpretations and the power of the European legal
system? What shapes when and where ECJ doctrine expands, when and where
European law penetrates national legal orders, and when and where the ECJ comes to
decisively influence national policy?
There are four steps—thresholds of activation of the European legal system-each of which needs to be surmounted in order for a litigation strategy to be employed.
These thresholds each generate sources of variation in the ECJ’s opportunity and ability
to be a politically influential actor. For European level litigation to influence national
policy: 1) there must be a point of European law to draw on; 2) litigants must seize on a
litigation strategy as a means to promote their objective; 3) national courts and the ECJ
must be willing to issue favorable rulings that support their objective; 4) there must be
political follow-through—a post-ruling political mobilization that shows political actors
(governments, firms) that there will be continued and mounting costs to maintaining an
illegal policy. Research has revealed a number of factors that shape each step. Here I
briefly summarize the analysis from the book and the literature, providing a general
overview of where we stand in understanding variation in where and when the ECJ
comes to influence legal debates:
Threshold 1: Enforceable law and the ECJ’s willingness to be a political player within
a policy domain
There has to be law that can be invoked by litigants. For most areas of European
law, every member state surmounts the first threshold, since the EC law applies in all
member states. EC law is mostly concerned with economic issues with a transnational
dimension, but the EU has jurisdiction in some national policy areas (such as
agriculture, value-added tax, and external trade); these are the areas of national policy
most likely to be affected by EU litigation.
Simply having the law is not enough. The ECJ also has to be willing to interpret
the law in ways that reward litigant efforts. Scholars have suggested that the ECJ is
more likely to rule against a national policy in areas where ECJ doctrine is well
developed than where it is not (Garrett, Kelemen, and Schulz 1998), when the material
and political costs of the legal decision are relatively low (Conant 2002), when there is
no political consensus against the ECJ’s decision among member states (Maduro 1998),
or when public opinion supports enforcement of the European rule (Carrubba and
Murrah 2005; Caldeira and Gibson 1995). These suggestions come more from theory
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than empirical investigation. While scholars have attempted to explain ECJ decisionmaking across cases (Kilroy 1999), so far no one has been able to link ECJ decisionmaking to any set of factors—such as the political power of states, or public opinion on
a policy area.11
Social science approaches have thus far largely failed to explain the decisionmaking of the ECJ (e.g. when the ECJ will rule against states, or be an expansionist
law-maker), or of any international court for that matter.12 The best we can say is that it
is clearly not true that the ECJ seizes every opportunity to aggrandize its power. The
ECJ is constrained by a few factors. The law itself provides a constraint. Also, the ECJ
hesitates to insert itself in polycentric contexts (e.g. where there are many centers of
authority and control).13 We can also say that the ECJ is most likely to be assertive when
European law is very clear, and when the issue touches on its own powers and
prerogatives. The ECJ also clearly looks for a set of sub-state actors that prefer EU law
enforcement, and it considers the positions of the majority of states on an issue (Maduro
1998). I used the short-hand of social support to capture these factors.
Threshold 2: Interested litigants
Given the central role of litigants in bringing the ICs into policy debates, much
of my work has focused on explaining litigant mobilization. Neo-functionalist theory
has largely assumed that self-interested actors will present themselves, using the legal
system to promote their case whenever it is profitable (e.g. when the political benefits
exceed the costs of litigation, and when better routes to achieve their goal are not
present). But if we consider the many cases that are not pursued, it becomes clear that
narrow self-interest (e.g. the possibility of profiting through litigation) is neither
necessary nor sufficient for potential plaintiffs to emerge.
The European Commission knows that litigants will not self-organize. The
Commission has actively sought out interlocutors so as to build a constituency that
might support its efforts. In the area of equal pay, for example, Elaine Vogel Polsky, a
former European official, first published an article where she suggested that European
11

Most scholars use as a dependant variable national court references to the ECJ, not ECJ decision-making
(Stone Sweet 1999; Carrubba and Murrah 2005). Bernadette Kilroy’s study is an exception, but her study
does not adequately control for alternative explanations, and she is unable to find support for her key
hypothesis—that the ECJ bends to the political will of powerful states. For a discussion of Kilroy’s
analysis, see: (Pollack 2003). Qualitative studies have been able to conclude that the ECJ is not bending to
the preferences of states (as argued before the ECJ), and that the ECJ tends to be a purposeful interpreter of
European law (Stone Sweet 2004; Cichowski 2007), but these studies tend focus on issue areas where it is
known that the ECJ is a purposive interpreter of the rules (Stone and Cichowski look at the environment as
a control case). As far as I know, no one has systematically examined ECJ decision-making across a
variety of issue areas.
12
Erik Voeten’s work on judicial voting in the ECHR is a notable exception, though Voeten is focused
more on how individual judges behave than on the ECHR overall (Voeten Forthcoming 2008).
13
The ECJ has refused to become involved in enforcing WTO law (see Chapter 10 in my 2009 book). The
ECJ has, however, recently taken on a role overseeing implementation of UN Security Council directives.
See: the Kadi decision (joined cases C 402/05 and 415/05) available at: http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgibin/form.pl?lang=en&Submit=Rechercher&alldocs=alldocs&docj=docj&docop=docop&docor=docor&do
cjo=docjo&numaff=C-402/05&datefs=&datefe=&nomusuel=&domaine=&mots=&resmax=100
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law could be a tool to dismantle national policies that contributed to gender
discrimination (Vogel-Polsky 1967). When no case raising the issue appeared, VogelPolsky went in search of a litigant. Her test case, Defrenne v. Sabena, established the
direct effect of European gender equality provisions.14 Vogel-Polsky then wrote articles
suggesting that the Defrenne ruling could be generalized to other gender equality cases
(Vogel-Polsky 1985; Harlow and Rawlings 1992: 283). The Commission took up
where Vogel-Polsky left off, working to disseminate information about the ECJ’s
equality rulings. The Commission also sought to mobilize actors in other member states
to follow the British strategy. It held conferences for equality actors to exchange
information, published ‘how to’ guides on pursuing gender discrimination cases, and
conducted the studies I drew on in a study on variation in equal pay litigation across
member states.15
Rachel Cichowski identified another way the Commission helps to organize
groups. The Commission uses its power to propose legislation to mobilize domestic
actors, and to keep previously mobilized actors interested in European Union politics. A
key contribution of Cichowski’s work is that she connects litigation based strategies to a
legislation based strategy, showing the feedback effects across the legal and policymaking domains (Cichowski 2007).
What factors explain variation in the willingness of groups to organize around
European initiatives? Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings develop a rather vague
notion of how the “goodness of fit” between European law and domestic law shapes
whether domestic actors organize to exert Pressure through Law (Harlow and Rawlings
1992). My work has sought to identify the factors that contribute to a goodness of fit. A
number of conjectures can be stated in a general way.
Political commitments to the larger objectives the rules represent: Legal
victories can reveal the disjuncture between government’s formal commitments and its
actual practice (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999: 23-25). Litigants are more likely to
mobilize around a litigation strategy where there is deep social commitment to
objectives the rules promote, because judges are more likely to reward litigant efforts in
such cases and because a legal ruling will be more embarrassing for the government.
Where governments and public opinion appears uninterested in the larger objectives
(e.g. building a common market in coal and steel), litigants are more likely to be
perceived as narrowly self-interested and judges are less likely to issue far-reaching
decisions because they will lack broader social support for their rulings. Thus political
support for the rules themselves, and the objectives the rules promote, increases the
chance of litigant mobilization.
The way collective actors (movements, interest groups, etc) are organized
shapes whether litigation is an attractive strategy: In a study on variation in equal pay
litigation across Europe we found that in certain countries women’s groups saw
promoting equal pay and equal treatment for men and women as a key objective, while
in other countries women’s groups focused more on family matters or on how women
14

Defrenne v. Sabena [1976] I.C.R. 547; Defrenne v. Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aérienne
Sabena [1978] E.C.R. 1365,ECJ.
15
Originally published as (Alter and Vargas 2000). Reprinted as chapter 8 of my 2009 book.
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can mix work with their familial obligations. These different constructions of the
“problems” faced by women led to different strategies when it came to using law as a
policy tool (Alter, 2009: Chapter 7).
Examining studies on different litigation rates, we drew a number of
conclusions: Litigation is often a tool of the weak, used because actors cannot use the
political system to address their concerns. Groups excluded from the political process
are more likely to turn to litigation compared to groups with privileged political access.
More narrowly focused groups are more likely to turn to litigation strategies. Thus
national variations in how group mandates are defined (broad versus narrow mandates),
who is part of a group (broad versus narrow constituencies), and the type of access the
group has to policy-makers will shape whether litigation is embraced as a tool of
political influence (See chapter 9 of my 2009 book for more hypotheses).
Threshold 3: National Judicial Support
Quantitative studies have sought to explain variation in national reference rates to the
European Court of Justice. The best quantitative study to date, authored by Clifford
Carruba and Lacey Murrah (Carrubba and Murrah 2005), moves beyond the rather
simplistic assertion that trade levels among states translate directly into references to the
ECJ. While helpful in the aggregate, such studies are not really helpful to litigants
because they do not predict the likelihood that a litigant’s case will be referred to the
ECJ.16 Where litigants can forum shop, they are more likely to be able to find a
sympathetic judge. Where litigants are unable to seek out judges, however, institutional
factors within a legal system can shape the likelihood of a reference to the ECJ.
Domestic rules of standing present one potential barrier—if litigants are
deemed to lack legal standing, their case will never be referred to the ECJ. Variation in
the standing of unions and interest groups in raising cases was one factor accounting for
the variation in equal pay litigation across European states (Fitzpatrick, Gregory, and
Szyszczak 1993: Chapter 5).
Predilections of judges can also present barriers. For example, the French
Conseil d’Etat has been historically reluctant to refer cases to the ECJ (Alter, 2001:
138-57).17 In Britain, Employment Appeals Tribunals were historically hostile to equal
pay claims (Alter and Vargas 2000). Jonathan Golub also found British courts reluctant
to refer cases involving environmental issues (Golub 1995). These predilections come
from policy preferences (e.g. political leanings) and the social background (e.g. the
training and professional background of judges, and institutional histories of courts) of
judges, thus they are systematic as opposed to idiosyncratic. These predilections do
reveal themselves quantitatively, but they are less easily tested through regression
studies, and perhaps for this reason they are seldom investigated. Judicial predilections
16

For example, Carrubba and Murrah find that legal traditions (whether a country is monist or dualist,
whether there is a tradition of judicial review) and public opinion shape the prevalence of references. But
it is still true that a litigant can procure a reference to the ECJ from within a country where unfavorable
traditions or public opinion exists.
17
French authors have explained this reluctance based on the recruitment system; members of the Conseil
d’Etat are trained with future government officials, and they themselves float in and out of government
(Radamaker 1988).
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make the difference for a litigant who is seeking to use the European legal system to
shift domestic policy.
Threshold 4: Political follow–through
Legal pronouncements are rarely the end of the story. Where national courts will
enforce legal rulings, and where government actors want to comply with legal rulings,
we can expect fairly automatic compliance with legal rulings. Broader policy shifts are
usually a result of post-ruling politics where the costs of maintaining contradictory
policies are revealed.
Group mobilization v. individual private actor mobilization: Individual litigants
are likely to be satisfied with a legal remedy that applies just to them. Cases where
group actors are mobilized are more likely to have an amplified political impact because
group members encourage each other to be bold and activist, and because groups are
better able to follow legal victories with political strategies—advertising legal victories,
finding copycat cases, and showing governments the cost of maintaining illegal
policies. Sometimes groups seize on to cases that were raised by unaffiliated private
actors. Also, because groups often lack standing, and because legal narratives play
better when there is an actual person involved, often members of groups shed their
affiliation for the purpose of raising a legal case. But unless a group actor (an
institution, powerful state, or an NGO) mobilizes behind a legal ruling, the ruling is
unlikely to have broad political impact.
The Four Thresholds Taken Together
Clearly these thresholds are related in that factors that positively affect one
threshold are also likely to positively affect the other thresholds. In other words, where
there is social support for the rules, legal rules are more likely to be clearer, litigants are
more likely to mobilize to legally enforce the rules, and judges are more likely to
reward litigant efforts. The reason to separate them, however, is because individual
factors at each step can also derail legal integration. Even where there is social support
for certain outcomes, groups may not mobilize around a litigation strategy, judges
(national and supranational) may refuse to decide the case in ways that reward litigant
efforts, or there may be no follow-through on a legal decisions to generate a more
amplified political affect to the ruling. Also, the reasons a threshold may not be
surmounted may also have little to do with factors related to European integration.
Rather, national institutional variations can translate into systematic variations in the
penetration of European law into national systems, and in the appeal to using the
European legal system as a tool of political change.
What do these conclusions mean in terms of the political power of the ECJ?
Courts are generally tipping point political actors. Where there are powerful actors on
both sides of an issue, but governments have for whatever reason privileged an arguably
less law-compliant outcome, courts can be invoked by one side to tip the balance in the
opposite direction. Courts are more likely to be invoked where there are organized
interests that support the rules in question. Also, courts are more likely to be willing to
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aid groups in achieving their agenda when the law in question is extremely clear, and
when their legal authority is both exclusive and clear.
Intervening politically is risky. Judges generally will not substitute their own
interpretations for politically constructed outcomes where the political terrain is a
minefield sown with intensely held deeply divided political beliefs (which can manifest
in public opinion measures), and where their own bases of legitimacy are weak. Courts
are also hesitant to intervene in highly complex polycentric environments, especially if
their own authority is likely to be undercut by other authoritative actors operating in the
same terrain.

III. Lessons from the ECJ experience
Variation in ECJ influence may be the norm, but we still have the reality that the
ECJ is perhaps the most politically influential international court in the world. The
ECJ’s experience in constructing the basis of its own authority is probably more similar
to what domestic constitutional courts have done to build their authority than what
international courts tend to do. Yet, the ECJ clearly started out as an international court.
Its authority was based on an international treaty. While integration activists hoped
integration would erode national commitments, member states and national judges in
the early period of European integration (1950-1980), and arguably even today, clearly
approached the EEC and the ECJ as an international institution. What could explain
why the EC experience has been so exceptional? What is so unique about Europe that
its supranational courts have come to have such significant political roles?
The ECJ had a number of factors in its favor. Europe’s legal fields were more
developed than legal fields in many other countries, which is to say that there is greater
political prestige accorded to legal actors in Europe, and well developed traditions and
structures that could be fairly easily adapted to the cause of legal integration.18 The
European integration project was also not simply a collection of economic or
functionally beneficial agreements. Rather, a fervent set of actors saw European
integration as part of a larger political endeavor of building peace in Europe, united
under a rule of law so as to limit any return to authoritarian practices. These factors
were important in the history of Europe, but they provide only part of the story. The
Euro-law movement was committed and active, but small. How were the vast majority
of actors not committed to the European integration as a social or economic project
brought along in support of the ECJ’s constitutionalization project? Also, there are other
contexts where the legal profession has extensive legal fields, and where legal actors are
ideologically committed to international legal strategies.19 Why did a perfect storm of
legal and social support come together to facilitate European legal integration?
18

Forming a legal association for a new issue of law was a fairly standard in European states. There was
also a tradition of publishing legal briefs, and many outlets for legal briefs. See Alter 2009 Chapter 4 for
more.
19
Organization for Economic Cooperation Development (OECD) countries present obvious examples of
countries with developed legal fields. Human rights presents another area where legal fields are organized
around legalized strategies: (See Dezalay and Garth 2002; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Sikkink and Lutz
2001).
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Part I of this essay discussed how jurist advocacy movements mobilized to
support the ECJ in the 1960s, how national judges were co-opted into the ECJ’s project
of establishing the supremacy of European law within national systems, and how
national judicial support contributed to national governments into accepting a
fundamental political transformation that ceded important elements of national
sovereignty in ways they did not intend, want, or ever really endorse. But this story is
also incomplete in that it focuses mainly on explaining the acceptance of European law
supremacy by the ECJ’s direct interlocutors. It takes for granted that national courts had
the power to lend to the ECJ, so that harnessing national courts became an effective
political strategy.
I am increasingly coming to believe that the ECJ’s story is part of a larger
institutional and political evolution wherein courts in Europe have become the political
actors of today, capable of ending Italian practices of dividing power among Christian
Democratic and Socialist parties so as to exclude the Communist Party from power,
capable of stripping Augusto Pinochet’s immunity, thus contributing to an international
human rights justice cascade that has reverberated around the world (Sikkink and Lutz
2001). Saskia Sassen’s work suggests as much (Sassen 2006). She identifies larger
global trends, locating the rise of judicial power as part of the rise of the bourgeoisie,
and the ascent of liberal democracy as an organizational form of government. She sees
judicial authority as further advanced by the rise of executive authority (at the expense
of legislative authority), the rise of the administrative state, and the development of a
rights based politics. Her explanation surely capture important factors, but her account
is underspecified in that these larger changes have occurred in many states which have
not replicated the Europe’s penchant for embracing supra-national legal authority.
I believe that Europe’s particular history of wanting to overcome the legacy of
World War II, including the deadly war among neighbors, the judicial collaboration
with authoritarian regimes, and the egregious trampling of individual rights, was key in
facilitating national transformations, and the ECJ’s success. Europe’s World War II
history mattered in a few ways.
First, Europe’s history helped to build the networks behind pro-European jurist
advocacy movements. In the late 1940s, European countries were ruled politically by
former members of the anti-fascist resistance. Many of these initial political leaders
continued in politics, although quite a number ended up with powerful positions but not
as political leaders themselves. Those actors who did not themselves stay in
government became representatives in international legal negotiations, and they later
used their political offices to aid the European integration project (Madsen and Vauchez
2005). It is not unique for opposition politics to create a networked class of actors who
become central in building a new polity. It is, however, unusual for law and
constitutional development to be so central to the agenda of such actors, and for
international law to figure so highly as part of their reformist agenda.
Europe’s history also emboldened jurists—lawyers, judges, and legal
scholars—as a group. In the 1950s and 1960s European states were expanding their
role in national economies. Political liberals and national judges responded by creating
checks on political bodies as they expanded their role, though for different reasons.
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Liberals wanted to limit as much as possible government involvement in the economy.
They were a constant constituency to challenge state authority, but they did not always
or even mostly succeed in their legal efforts. Jurists as a group mainly wanted to ensure
that governments’ expanded role adhered to the rule of law. Originally, many jurists’
conception of what constituted the rule of law was rather limited. It did not include
courts conducting constitutional review of national law, and the legal rights protected
by courts tended to be more procedural than fundamental in that there were few courts,
in even fewer countries, assessing whether constitutional guarantees were adequately
respected by the political branches of government. Over time, basic rights became
politically important. It is increasingly common for jurists today to frame their
discourse and agenda around a ‘rights’-based politics, and thus to be part of a vanguard
demanding democratic constitutional reforms (Halliday, Karpik, and Feeley 2007:
Introduction), but this is a more recent transformation both in Europe and in the larger
international context.
Somewhat distinct is that in Europe, jurists were joined in their more narrowly
conceived endeavor of promoting the rule of law by civil servants. Under authoritarian
rule (and during parts of Europe’s history), ideology and political loyalty were key
criteria shaping appointment and promotion in civil service positions. European
bureaucracies became professionalized in the 1950s and 1960s, meaning that expertise
and competence rather than political connections emerged as the basis for appointment
and promotion within national administrations.20 Civil servants with expertise and
competence chafe at political manipulations of rules, and they became a constituency in
support of judges rejecting politically inspired interpretations of legal rules. Thus
lawyers had actors within the state they could appeal to and work with to help realize
their objective of having governments respect the rule of law.
Finally, Europe’s experience with World War II fundamentally changed
popular attitudes in Europe. European citizens mobilized time and again to demand
their government adhere to the democratic objectives they expected. This synergy
between the ECJ’s objective of building supranational legal checks on supranational
political authority and the larger agenda within European states and societies of creating
legal checks on political power created a willingness for national judges to work with
the ECJ by referring cases involving European law (the interpretation of which was
outside of the competence of national judges). Because of European citizens’
commitments to many of the ideals embedded into European Community law, because
national judges agreed to enforce European laws, and because civil servants were
committed to adhering to legal rulings, bringing the ECJ into specific policy debates
could be a potent political tool. [This might be a good place to reference other articles
in this symposium]

20

I am indebted to Antoine Vauchez for this insight.
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IV An Agenda for further research on the ECJ: The Political
Determinants of Social Support
The larger argument I am making is that the ECJ didn’t just declare for itself
more power. The ECJ was emboldened to issue its audacious legal ruling because it had
the active and explicit support of a network of jurists who were aiding its endeavors.
These actors helped to shift the national legal terrain from underneath a set of powerful
national courts that were not themselves supportive the ECJ’s larger project. The ECJ
also benefited from a fortuitous set of circumstances. It was building its own authority
at the same time as national judiciaries were building their own bases of power. Indeed
it is quite likely that the ECJ was able to co-opt national judges because the
developments the ECJ was promoting mirrored steps being taken simultaneously by
national judiciaries. In other words, it was the developments underway within
European states---the growth of judicial power, an emerging commitment to asserting
and protecting individual’s basic rights, and the growth and professionalization of the
administrative state in European countries—that provided the ECJ with willing
interlocutors that could be mobilized around the ECJ’s project of using legal means to
force European states to adhere to their European legal commitments.
What would we need to know to substantiate these speculations? For the
European story we would need to know more about the development of post-war
national legal institutions, and how legal developments influenced and were influenced
by European legal integration. We would also need to know more about how synergies
develop. Why do international law-domestic law synergies not develop in other
contexts? Why are technical rules sometimes better for promoting international legal
integration while in other contexts constitutional norms, like basic rights laws, connect
better to domestic agendas? Why, for example, did a synergy develop around enforcing
fairly technical European Community rules (an administrative law dynamic) rather than
the more far-reaching and politically central tenets of the European Convention on
Human Rights (a constitutional law dynamic)? These questions are far from academic
since many practioners and scholars are trying to unlock the factors contributing to the
creation of a stable and independent domestic rules of law.21
In terms of the study of Europe, the empirical and theoretical agenda this
argument suggests would be to investigate the development of powerful national legal
institutions, which I believe is one of the defining features of post-World War II
European politics. The judiciary was one of the many political institutions that had
been discredited through collaboration during World War II. Lawyers and politicians
realized that significantly different legal structures needed to be created, but they had to
work with the stock of lawyers, professors, and judges that existed. It took new
generations of lawyers, professors, and judges entering the legal apparatus, and rising
into positions of authority for change to occur. Also newly established legal
structures—constitutional courts and new administrative systems—needed to build their
authority, to create a new reality that scholars could study and explicate, and that legal
actors within national legal systems could respond to and emulate. Given how long
21

For example, see (Hammergren 2007; Maravall and Przeworski 2003; O'Donnell 2004)
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these changes took, it is not surprising that political scientists who focused on European
politics in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and even the early 1980s missed what was
happening. Legal evolutions became impossible to ignore in the 1990s because judges
started successfully challenging the practices of powerful political elites. Now that we
now know the end of the story—in the 1990s administrative and legal actors became
key contributors to large-scale political changes, and judicial review has emerged as an
important force of policy-making and institutional change—we need to go back in time
to add courts back into our earlier understandings. There is strong scholarship on the
rise of constitutional courts in Europe (see for example Stone Sweet 2000), but less
scholarship on larger social and political changes within national bars, judiciaries, and
educational systems.22 We need to investigate why and how Europe’s legal institutions
changed in the post-World War II era (and why legal institutions in other contexts did
not change in the same way).
Beyond legal institutional changes, we need to investigate how these changes
contributed to legal and political developments in Europe. We need to connect, as
Francesca Bignami, Rachel Cichowski, and Peter Lindseth are doing, European level
changes to national evolutions (Bignami 2005; Lindseth 2005, 2003; Cichowski 2007).
And we need to connect legal changes to larger political changes within and across
states. We should be able to locate the construction of a legal and administrative
European state into the construction of the economy, and into the construction of
constitutional democracy, to see how economic and political conditions shaped these
developments. Concretely, we should be able to link European legal developments to
our understandings about how ‘modern capitalism’ was built in Europe in the 1950s and
1960s (Shonfield 1969). We should also be able to identify how legal institutions were
part of the ‘embedded liberal’ meta compromise shaping international and European
economic systems in the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s (Ruggie 1983). We should be
able to see how legal institutions were part of Alan Milward’s explanation regarding
how European integration helped European countries deliver this embedded liberal
compromise, and thus how European integration helped resuscitate the political raison
d’être of the post-war European state (Milward 1992). We should be better able to link
the histories of European Community integration and the growing authority of the
European Convention on Human Rights. And we should be better able to understand
how institutional developments benefited from the external threat of the cold war, and
the unprecedented economic growth and stability in post-war Europe. When we
understand these relationships, we will better understand the pushmi-pullyu
relationship23 between law and politics.
22

When I began my research on the European legal system in the 1990s, it was extremely difficult to find
studies about national legal systems. I was forced to draw on a range of studies that were not directly on
point. I have not gone back to examine the literature that has since emerged, but my sense is that there still
is a dearth of studies by political scientists, historians or sociologists documenting changes in post-war
European legal institutions.
23
The pushmi-pullyu was the name of the two-headed creature connected at the waist in Hugh Lofting’s
tales of Dr Doolittle. The pushmi-pullyu had heads pointed in opposite directions. In order for the
pushmi-pullyu to walk, the two heads had to work together—one had to walk backwards, so the other
could go forwards. For law to work it must induce political actors to voluntarily yield, and if they are to
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Such understandings are relevant beyond Europe. It has long been recognized
that political institutions facilitate economic development. More recently it has been
suggested that legal institutions are important for political stability and economic
prosperity (Williamson 1990; Maravall and Przeworski 2003; Halliday, Karpik, and
Feeley 2007). But it is far from clear how we get to legal institutions that can facilitate
economic and political development, and how variation in legal institutions is related to
variations we find in cross-national and cross-temporal economic and political
development. Post-World War II Europe is a good place to investigate these questions.
But I still believe that these questions are best elucidated through comparative analysis.
Rule of law movements have been gaining increasing strength outside of Europe. I think
it would be most fruitful to examine the European rule of law movement in the 1950s
and 1960s alongside movements in other countries that are emerging from authoritarian
rule, as this would expose the importance of contextual factors that European focused
studies may well simply take for granted.
Equally important is that we move forward intellectually rather than replicate
the past. The early study of legal integration was hampered in a number of ways.
Archives were closed, and thus we lacked access to some inside information. But
scholars also self-censored themselves because legalism was the dominant scholarly
approach of European legal scholars, and because scholars of European integration
themselves were politically committed to European integration, which led to studies
that tended to whitewash the political elements of European legal integration.24 Studies
that examine both new and old questions of European integration and international law
should not simply replicate the past. In other words, we should not extend old studies to
new terrains, but rather use new approaches to examine both new and old terrains.
There are many old questions to investigate in the European context, since we
know so little about the legal changes in the post-war period. But there are also many
new questions to address. In Europe, the end of the Cold War opened the floodgates for
EU membership. There is of course a burgeoning literature focusing on how European
Union membership affects Central European countries’ policy and politics (Vachudová
2005; Schimmelfennig 2003; Jacoby 2004; Kelley 2004). EU enlargement also offers a
cornucopia of ways to investigate how domestic legal institutions reform, how external
forces influence domestic reform efforts, and how legal authority gets built (or not
built). The current generation of scholars has a chance to document how legal
institutions are evolving independently from and in relationship to national political
reforms, and to investigate if the EU or other external legal obligations (e.g. the Council
of Europe, WTO membership) accelerate or are undermined by domestic institutional
evolution.
The question of how enlargement affects institutional development in new
member states is especially interesting because the latest set of entrants are both
yield, the legal process must take into account deeply felt political concerns even if it leads to outcomes
that are poorly reasoned from a legal perspective. This analogy comes from Alter (2002: 120).
24
For more on the sociology of knowledge regarding European integration, see chapter 2 of the European
Court’s Political Power (2009). For more on how legalist approaches systematically ignore political
factors, see: (Alter 2002)
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emerging from authoritarian rule and seeking to industrialize in ways that can integrate
these countries into the global economy. Newer EU members are thus more comparable
to domestic polities in other regions of the world (including national courts in the
Andean context). One would expect the European Union to again present a case that is
located on the far side of a continuum in terms of international factors being likely to
shape domestic development. The former Soviet satellite countries have a number of
extremely compelling reasons to truly embrace democratic forms of governance and the
rule of law—including membership in the EU. Indeed the EU serves as an anchor with
common sets of rules and a model of how these rules are meant to be implemented, and
nowhere in the world is there an institution as willing or invested in helping domestic
reformers as the European Union. Of course there are many counter-forces at work, and
while incentives are strong they may not be strong enough. I do not assume the
European Union will be highly successful in inducing desired changes in former Soviet
satellites, nor is it likely that all or even most changes that occur will be because of EU
efforts. Rather, once again we should expect that if the Europeans cannot influence
their neighbors, then the EU and other international efforts may be even less likely to
influence legal and political development in other regions of the world.
The ultimate objective of such investigations would be to expose how the social
and political context of legal actors influences their behavior, and thereby how domestic
and international factors co=mingle to influence the development and influence of
law—both national and international. A second objective would be to add law more
centrally back into political analyses, to remember that the judiciary is one of the three
branches of governments, that law is the chief tool used by governments to govern, and
that legal strategies are often the most viable way to promote political change for actors
whose access to the levers are political power are blocked.
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